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Abstract
A visual cryptography scheme encodes a black and white secret image into n shadow images called shares which are distributed
to the n participants. Such shares are such that only qualiﬁed subsets of participants can “visually’’ recover the secret image.
Usually, the reconstructed image will be darker than the background of the image itself. In this paper we consider visual cryp-
tography schemes satisfying the model introduced by Tzeng and Hu [A new approach for visual cryptography, Designs, Codes and
Cryptography 27 (3) (2002) 207–227]. In such a model, the recovered secret image can be darker or lighter than the background.
We prove a lower bound on the pixel expansion of the scheme and, for (2, n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes, we provide
schemes achieving the bound. Our schemes improve on the ones proposed by Tzeng and Hu.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A visual cryptography scheme for a set P of n participants is a method to encode a secret black and white image
SI into n shadow images called shares, where each participant in P receives one share. Certain qualiﬁed subsets of
participants can “visually’’ recover the secret image, but other, forbidden, sets of participants have no information (in
an information-theoretic sense) on SI. A “visual’’ recovery for a set X ⊆ P consists of xeroxing the shares given to the
participants in X onto transparencies, and then stacking them. The participants in a qualiﬁed set X will be able to see
the secret image without any knowledge of cryptography and without performing any cryptographic computation.
This cryptographic paradigm was introduced by Naor and Shamir in their seminal paper [4]. They analyzed the case
of (k, n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes, in which the secret image is visible if any k or more transparencies are
stacked together. If fewer than k transparencies are stacked together, then the resulting image will be indistinguishable
from random noise. More generally, any set of k − 1 participants can analyze their collection of shares by any means,
but they will obtain no information about the secret image.
In order to implement a visual cryptography scheme, each pixel of the original image is encoded into n version called
shares, one for each transparency. Each share is composed of m black and white subpixels. When we superimpose two
white subpixels we obtain a white subpixel; while superimposing one black subpixel to any other subpixel, we get a
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 89 965403; fax: +39 89 965272.
E-mail address: carblu@dia.unisa.it (C. Blundo).
0304-3975/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2006.08.008
170 C. Blundo et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 369 (2006) 169–182
Fig. 1. The original image and the shares of a (2, 3)-threshold VCS.
Fig. 2. Images reconstructed by participants 1 and 2 and 1 and 3, respectively.
black subpixel. Thus, the grey level of the combined share obtained by stacking some transparencies is proportional to
the number of black subpixels appearing in it. This grey level is interpreted by the visual system of the users as black
or as white in accordance with some rule of contrast.
In the model introduced by Naor and Shamir, the grey level of a “reconstructed’’ black pixel will be greater than the
grey level of a “reconstructed’’ white one. In other words, the reconstructed image will be darker than the background
of the image itself.
In this paper, we consider visual cryptography schemes satisfying the model introduced by Tzeng and Hu in [5]. In
such a model, the recovered secret image can be darker or lighter than the background.
The best way to understand such a new model is by resorting to an example. We want to realize a (2, 3)-threshold
visual cryptography schemes. Hence, there are three participants, that is P = {1, 2, 3}, and any two of them can
recover the secret image. We want to encode the secret image “TCS’’. For this example, the visual cryptography
scheme satisfying the model in [5] is described in (1). The original image and the three shares generated are as depicted
in Fig. 1. Three of them look like random patterns and, indeed, no individual share provides any information, even to
an inﬁnitely powerful computer, on the original image. If we superimpose the transparencies associated to participants
1 and 2 and to participants 1 and 3, respectively, we get the result given in Fig. 2.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to (2, n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes. We prove a lower bound on
the pixel expansion of the scheme and we provide visual cryptography schemes achieving the bound. Our schemes
improve, with respect to the pixel expansion, on the ones presented in [5].
2. Model and notation
Let P = {1, . . . , n} be a set of elements called participants, and let 2P denote the set of all subsets of P . Let
Qual ⊆ 2P and Forb ⊆ 2P , where Qual ∩ Forb = ∅. We refer to members of Qual as qualiﬁed sets and we call
members of Forb forbidden sets. The pair (Qual,Forb) is called the access structure of the scheme.
Deﬁne 0 to consist of all the minimal qualiﬁed sets:
0 = {A ∈ Qual : A′ /∈ Qual for all A′ ⊂ A}.
A qualiﬁed set X that does not belong to 0, i.e., X ∈ Qual\0 is referred to as not-minimal qualiﬁed set.
A (k, n)-thresholdVCS is a visual cryptography scheme for the access structure with basis0 = {B ⊆ P : |B| = k}.
We assume that the image consists of a collection of black and white pixels. Each pixel appears in n versions called
shares, one for each transparency. Each share is a collection of m black and white subpixels. The resulting structure can
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be described by an n × m Boolean matrix S = [sij ] where sij = 1 iff the jth subpixel in the ith transparency is black.
Therefore, the grey level of the combined share, obtained by stacking the transparencies i1, . . . , is , is proportional to
the Hamming weight w(V ) of the m-vector V = OR(ri1 , . . . , ris ) where ri1 , . . . , ris are the rows of S associated with
the transparencies we stack. This grey level is interpreted by the visual system of the users as black or as white in
according with some rule of contrast. The conventional deﬁnition [1] for visual cryptography schemes is as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let (Qual,Forb) be an access structure on a set of n participants. Two collections (multisets) of n×m
boolean matrices C0 and C1 constitute a visual cryptography scheme (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS if there exist the value
(m) and the set {(X, tX)}X∈Qual satisfying:
1. Any (qualiﬁed) set X = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ Qual can recover the shared image by stacking their transparencies.
Formally, for anyM ∈ C0, the “or’’V of rows i1, i2, . . . , ip satisﬁesw(V ) tX −(m) ·m; whereas, for anyM ∈ C1
it results that w(V ) tX.
2. Any (forbidden) set X = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ Forb has no information on the shared image.
Formally, the two collections of p × m matrices Dt , with t ∈ {0, 1}, obtained by restricting each n × m matrix
in Ct to rows i1, i2, . . . , ip, are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same matrices with the same
frequencies.
The ﬁrst property is related to the contrast of the image. It states that when a qualiﬁed set of users stack their
transparencies they can correctly recover the shared image (i.e., the revealed image is darker than the background, in
other words, the grey level of a reconstructed black pixel is bigger than the grey level of a reconstructed with pixel).
The value (m) is called relative difference, the number (m) · m is referred to as the contrast of the image, the set
{(X, tX)}X∈Qual is called the set of thresholds, and tX is the threshold associated to X ∈ Qual. We want the contrast
to be as large as possible and at least one, that is, (m) · m1. The second property is called security, since it implies
that, even by inspecting all their shares, a forbidden set of participants cannot gain any information in deciding whether
the shared pixel was white or black.
In the following we recall the deﬁnition of visual cryptography scheme provided in [5]. The main difference between
the such deﬁnition ofVCS and the “traditional’’one is that the property of contrast of the reconstructed image is changed
as the revealed image can be darker or lighter than the background (i.e., some qualiﬁed sets recover the original image,
while other qualiﬁed sets recover the “negative’’of the image itself). Moreover, as also done in [5], we assume that only
the sets in 0 can recover the shared image by stacking their transparencies. If a set X is a not-minimal qualiﬁed (i.e.,
it belongs to Qual\0), then we assume that the participants in X, stacking their transparencies, cannot distinguish a
white pixel from a black one. This is formalized by the next deﬁnition [5].
Deﬁnition 2.2. Let (Qual,Forb) be an access structure on a set of n participants. Two collections (multisets) of n×m
boolean matrices C0 and C1 constitute a visual cryptography scheme (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS if there exist the value
(m) and the set {(X, tX)}X∈Qual satisfying:
1. Any minimal qualiﬁed set X = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ 0 can recover the shared image by stacking their transparencies.
Formally, for any M ∈ C0, the “or’’ V of rows i1, i2, . . . , ip satisﬁes w(V ) = tX; whereas, either, for any M ∈ C1,
it results that w(V ) tX + (m) · m or, for any M ∈ C1, it results that w(V ) tX − (m) · m.
2. Any (forbidden) set X = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ Forb has no information on the shared image.
Formally, the two collections of p × m matrices Dt , with t ∈ {0, 1}, obtained by restricting each n × m matrix
in Ct to rows i1, i2, . . . , ip, are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same matrices with the same
frequencies.
3. Any not-minimal qualiﬁed setX = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ Qual\0, by stacking their transparencies, has no information
on the shared image.
Formally, the two collections of 1 × m vectors Vt , with t ∈ {0, 1}, obtained by OR-ing the rows i1, i2, . . . , ip of
each matrix in Ct are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same vectors with the same frequencies.
We see that Condition 1 of Deﬁnitions 2.1 and 2.2 is different. According to Deﬁnition 2.1, the revealed image is
darker than the background; while, according to Deﬁnition 2.2, the revealed image can be darker or lighter than the
background.Moreover, in this model we rule out the possibility that by stacking all the transparencies of the participants
in X ∈ Qual\0, some information about the secret image is revealed. However, notice that, if a set of participants
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X is a superset of a minimal qualiﬁed set X′ and they know the form of the access structure (Qual,Forb), then they
can recover the shared image by considering only the shares of the set X′. Moreover, when the participants in X do
not know the access structure they belong to, they can always recover the original image. Indeed, by inspecting their
transparencies all together, they can distinguish whether the shares come from a matrix in C0 or a matrix in C1.
In view of the above observations, we make few considerations about the structure of Qual and Forb. It is clear
that any subset of a forbidden subset is forbidden, so Forb is necessarily monotone decreasing. Hence, no superset of
a qualiﬁed subset is forbidden. Finally, w.l.o.g., we can assume that Qual is monotone increasing that is
Qual = {C ⊆ P : B ⊆ C for some B ∈ 0},
and we say that Qual is the closure of 0.
All constructions in this paper are realized using two n×m matrices, S0 and S1, called basis matrices satisfying the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let (Qual,Forb) be an access structure on a set of n participants. A (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS with
relative difference (m) and set of thresholds {(X, tX)}X∈Qual is realized using the two n × m basis matrices S0 and
S1 if the following two conditions hold.
1. IfX = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ 0 (i.e., if X is a minimal qualiﬁed set), then the “or’’V of rows i1, i2, . . . , ip of S0 satisﬁes
w(V ) = tX; whereas, for S1 it results that either w(V ) tX + (m) · m or w(V ) tX − (m) · m.
2. If X = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ Forb (i.e., if X is a forbidden set), then the two p ×m matrices obtained by restricting S0
and S1 to rows i1, i2, . . . , ip are equal up to a columns permutation.
3. If X = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ Qual\0, (i.e., X is a qualiﬁed set which is not minimal), then the two 1 × m vectors V0
and V1, obtained by OR-ing the rows i1, i2, . . . , ip of S0 and S1, respectively, have the same Hamming weight, that
is, w(V0) = w(V1).
The collections C0 and C1 are obtained by permuting the columns of the corresponding basis matrix (S0 for C0, and
S1 for C1) in all possible ways.
A visual cryptography scheme (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS which is optimal with respect to the pixel expansion m will
be referred to as an expansion-optimal VCS.
3. The Structure of VCS
Before providing some useful properties of VCS, we need to set up our notation. Let M be a n×m binary matrix. For
X ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let MX denote the m-vector obtained by considering the or of the rows corresponding to the indices
in X; whereas M[X] denotes the |X| × m matrix obtained from M by considering only the rows corresponding to the
indices in X. IfX = {r}, then instead of usingM[{r}] to denote the row r of M we will use the shortened notationM[r].
For any binary vector V, with w(V ) we denote the number of zeroes in V (i.e., the “complement’’ of the Hamming
weight). By abusing of notation, given two matrices A and B having the same number of rows, with A ∩ B = ∅ we
denote the fact that the same column does not appear in both matrices. In this case, the matrices A and B are referred
as non-redundant matrices. Finally, with A‖B we denote the matrix obtained by concatenating the matrices A and B.
We restrict our attention to (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS realized by non-redundant basis matrices S0 and S1. In this case,
if the access structure is not an (n, n)-threshold access structures, we will prove that Condition 3 of Deﬁnition 2.3
reduces to w(S0X) = w(S1X) = m, for any X ∈ Qual\0. We will also prove that the matrix S = S0‖S1 has to contain
some predeﬁned sub-matrices. The columns of such sub-matrices are referred to as “unavoidable patterns’’.
Theorem 3.1. In any (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS realized by the non-redundant basis matrices S0 and S1, for any X ∈
Qual\0, it holds that
w(S0X) = w(S1X) = m.
Proof. We will prove the theorem by contradiction by showing that if some set X ∈ Qual\0 does not satisfy
w(S0X) = w(S1X) = m, then S0 ∩ S1 
= ∅. We will consider the sets in Qual\0 in non-increasing order by size. Let
P = {1, . . . , n} be the set of n participants the access structure (Qual,Forb) is realized on. For 1 in, let Q(i) be
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the family of all qualiﬁed sets of size i which are not minimal, i.e., Q(i) = {X ∈ Qual\0 : |X| = i}. Since we are
considering Qual monotone increasing, it results that if X ∈ Q(i), then X ∪ {j} ∈ Q(i + 1) for any j ∈ P\X.
Let X ∈ Q(n) (notice that there is only one set in Q(n) as we do not consider (n, n)-threshold access structures)
and let  be a VCS for (Qual,Forb) such that S0 ∩ S1 = ∅ and w(S0X) = w(S1X) = mX < m. In this case, there
exist m − mX columns both in S0 and S1 whose entries are all equal to zero. This implies that S0 ∩ S1 
= ∅ which
contradicts the hypothesis. Hence, in the scheme  we have that w(S0X) = w(S1X) = m, for X ∈ Q(n).
If Q(n−1) = ∅, then there do not exist qualiﬁed sets X ∈ Qual\0 of cardinality n−1. Therefore, there is nothing
to prove. If Q(n− 1) 
= ∅, then, consider any set X ∈ Q(n− 1) and assume that w(S0X) = w(S1X) = mX < m. In this
case, there exist m−mX columns both in S0[X] and S1[X] whose entries are equal to zero. For the sake of simplicity,
assume these are the ﬁrst m − mX columns of both S0[X] and S1[X]. Let {i} = P\X. Since for Y = {i} ∪ X ∈ Q(n)
we proved that w(S0Y ) = w(S1Y ) = m, it must be the case that S0[i, 1] = · · · = S0[i, m − mX] = 1 and that
S1[i, 1] = · · · = S1[i, m − mX] = 1. Therefore, the ﬁrst m − mX columns of both S0 and S1 are equal. This
implies that S0 ∩ S1 
= ∅ which contradicts the hypothesis of the theorem. Hence, in the scheme  we have that
w(S0X) = w(S1X) = m, for any X ∈ Q(n − 1), too.
In general, if for some value q, we have thatQ(n−q) 
= ∅ and thatw(S0X) = w(S1X) = m for anyX ∈ Q(n−q+1),
then we can proceed as follows. Consider any set X ∈ Q(n − q) and assume that w(S0X) = w(S1X) = mX < m.
In this case, there exist m − mX columns both in S0[X] and S1[X] whose entries are equal to zero. For the sake of
simplicity assume these are the ﬁrst m − mX columns of both S0[X] and S1[X]. Since, for any i ∈ P\X, it holds that
w(S0Y ) = w(S1Y ) = m, where Y = {i} ∪ X ∈ Q(n − q + 1), then S0[i, j ] = S1[i, j ] = 1, for 1jm − mX and
i ∈ P\X. Therefore, the ﬁrst m − mX columns of both S0 and S1 are equal as they contain a zero in position j ∈ X
and a one in position i ∈ P\X. This implies that S0 ∩ S1 
= ∅ which contradicts the hypothesis of the theorem. Thus,
we can conclude that for any X ∈ Qual\0, it holds that w(S0X) = w(S1X) = m and the theorem is proved. 
The next corollary is a consequence of the above theorem.
Corollary 3.2. For any (k, n)-threshold VCS realized by the non-redundant basis matrices S0 and S1, there is no
column in S0‖S1 of weight less than n − k.
Proof. Let S = S0‖S1. According to Theorem 3.1, for any X ∈ Qual\0, it holds that w(SX) = 2m. Suppose by
contradiction that there is a column in S0‖S1 of weight t < n−k. This implies that in such a column there are n− t > k
entries, say the ﬁrst n − t , all equal to zero. Hence, w(SX) = 2m − 1, where X = {1, . . . , n − t}. This contradicts
w(SX) = 2m, for any X ∈ Qual\0. Thus, the corollary holds. 
The next lemma states that if there exists a VCS having basis matrices S0 and S1 such that S0 ∩ S1 
= ∅, then we
can always construct a new VCS with non-redundant basis matrices Ŝ0 and Ŝ1.
Lemma 3.3. If  is a (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS having contrast (m) realized by basis matrices S0 and S1 such that
S0 ∩S1 
= ∅, then there exists a (Qual,Forb, m̂)-VCS having contrast ̂(m̂) = (m) ·m/m̂ realized by non-redundant
basis matrices.
Proof. Let R = S0 ∩ S1, then the basis matrices S0 and S1 are equal, up to a column permutation, to the matrices
Ŝ0‖R and Ŝ1‖R, respectively. Assume that the matrix Ŝb, for b = 0, 1, has dimension n × m̂. We will prove that the
matrices Ŝ0 and Ŝ1 satisfy Deﬁnition 2.3.
For any X ∈ 0 by Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 2.3, we have that w(S0X) = w(Ŝ0X) + w(RX) = tX and either
w(S1X) = w(Ŝ1X) + w(RX) tX + (m) · m or w(S1X) = w(Ŝ1X) + w(RX) tX − (m) · m. Setting t̂X = tX − w(RX)
and ̂(m̂) = (m) · m/m̂ we have that w(Ŝ0X) = t̂X and either w(Ŝ1X) t̂X + ̂(m̂) · m̂ or w(Ŝ1X) t̂X − ̂(m̂) · m̂.
Therefore , the matrices Ŝ0 and Ŝ1 satisfy Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 2.3.
For any X ∈ Forb, Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 2.3 states that S0[X] is equal, up to a column permutation, to S1[X].
Therefore, the matrices Ŝ0[X] and Ŝ1[X] are equal, up to a column permutation, too. Hence, the matrices Ŝ0 and Ŝ1
satisfy Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 2.3.
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Finally, for any X ∈ Qual\0, Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 2.3 states that w(S0X) = w(S1X). Since w(S0X) = w(Ŝ0X)+
w(RX) and w(S1X) = w(Ŝ1X) + w(RX), we get that w(Ŝ0X) = w(Ŝ1X). Therefore, the matrices Ŝ0 and Ŝ1 satisfy
Condition 3 of Deﬁnition 2.3. Thus, the lemma holds. 
In the following theorem we will prove that the matrices S0 and S1 have to contain some predeﬁned patterns which
we call unavoidable patterns. More precisely, for any VCS the matrix S0‖S1 has to contain some ﬁxed columns
determined by 0.
Theorem 3.4. In any (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS realized by the basis matrices S0 and S1, for any X = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈
0, either S0 or S1 contains at least (m) · m columns with a “0’’ in the rows {i1, i2, . . . , ip} and “1’’s in the other
rows.
Proof. Assume that the VCS is realized by non-redundant basis matrices S0 and S1. If this is not the case, then, by
applying Lemma 3.3, we can construct a new VCS whose basis matrices have empty intersection and whose pixel
expansion m̂ and contrast ̂(m̂) satisfy ̂(m̂) · m̂ = (m) ·m. Consider any set of participantsX = {i1, i2, . . . , ip} ∈ 0.
From Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 2.2, we have that w(S0X) = tX and that either w(S1X) tX + (m) · m or w(S1X)
tX − (m) · m. Assuming that w(S1X) tX + (m) · m, we get w(S1X) − w(S0X)(m) · m. Therefore, the matrix
S0[X] must contain at least (m) · m columns with all entries equal to zero. Moreover, by Theorem 3.1, we have
that w(S0Y ) = w(S1Y ) = m, for any Y such that X ⊂ Y . Therefore, the matrix S0 contains at least (m) · m columns
with a “0’’ in the rows {i1, i2, . . . , ip} and “1’’s in the other rows. We can apply the same reasoning as above when
w(S1X) tX−(m)·m, proving that thematrixS1 contains at least (m)·m columnswith a “0’’in the rows {i1, i2, . . . , ip}
and “1’’s in the other rows. Thus, the theorem is proved. 
From the above theorem, one can easily get that in any visual cryptography scheme realized by non-redundant basis
matrices (i.e., S0∩S1 = ∅), the number of columns of S0‖S1 is at least |0| ·(m) ·m. Therefore, since (m) ·m1 and
m has to be an integer value, we can immediately get a bound on the pixel expansion for any (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS
as stated by the next theorem.
Theorem 3.5. In any (Qual,Forb,m)-VCS realized by basis matrices, the pixel expansion satisﬁes
m|0|/2.
We give the following two examples to illustrate the deﬁnition of unavoidable patterns and the use of Theorem 3.5,
when P = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Example 3.1. Deﬁne 0 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}}. The unavoidable patterns are:⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 1 1
0 0 1
1 0 0
1 1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
The following basis matrices S0 and S1 realize a VCS for 0.
S0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 1 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , S1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 1 0
1 0 1
1 0 1
0 1 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
The unavoidable patterns⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
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belongs to S0, while, the unavoidable pattern
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1
0
0
1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
belongs to S1. In this scheme, m = 3 and (m) = 13 .
Example 3.2. Deﬁne 0 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4}, {1, 4}}. The unavoidable patterns are:⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
The basis matrices S0 and S1 realizing a VCS for 0 are as follows:
S0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , S1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
1 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
In this scheme, m = 2 and (m) = 12 .According to Theorem 3.5 the VCS realized by S0 and S1 is optimal with respect
to the pixel expansion.
Recall that a (k, n)-thresholdVCS is a visual cryptography scheme for the access structure with basis0 = {B ⊆ P :
|B| = k}. In [4] Naor and Shamir proved that for any (n, n)-threshold VCS the pixel expansion satisﬁes m2n−1. The
structure of basis matrices (n, n)-threshold VCS was completely characterized in [3]. The proof of Theorem 7.1 in [3]
can easily be modiﬁed in order to prove that for any (n, n)-threshold VCS satisfying Deﬁnition 2.3 the pixel expansion
is lower bounded by 2n−1, too. In the case of (k, n)-threshold access structures, with k < n, the next corollary provides
a bound on m.
Corollary 3.6. In any (k, n)-threshold VCS, with 2k < n, realized by basis matrices, the pixel expansion satisﬁes
m
⌈(
n
k
)
/2
⌉
.
In the next section, we will see that above bound is tight for (2, n)-threshold VCS when n ≡ 1mod 4. For the other
cases, we will provide stronger bounds.
4. Optimal (2, n)-threshold VCS
In this section, we will prove a bound on the pixel expansion of (2, n)-threshold VCS, with n > 2, realized by basis
matrices. We will show that such bound is tight by presenting (2, n)-threshold VCS meeting it.
4.1. The bound
In this section, we prove a lower bound on the pixel expansion stronger than the one provided by Corollary 3.6 when
n is even or n ≡ 3mod 4.
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Theorem 4.1. In any (2, n)-threshold VCS, with n > 2, constructed using basis matrices the pixel expansion satisﬁes
m
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
n2
4
if n ≡ 0 mod 2,
n(n − 1)
4
if n ≡ 1 mod 4,
n2 − n + 6
4
if n ≡ 3 mod 4.
Proof. Assume that n is even and let  be a (2, n)-threshold VCS constructed using the basis matrices S0 and S1. Let
S be the binary matrix equal to S = S0‖S1. Because of Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 2.3, it results that both the number
of zeroes and the number of ones in any row of S is even. According to Corollary 3.2, all columns in S have weight at
least n − 2. Moreover, from Theorem 3.4, all the ( n2 ) distinct columns of weight n − 2 (i.e., the unavoidable patterns)
have to appear in S. Therefore, S is equal, up to a columns permutation to the matrix A‖B, where A is a n× ( n2 ) matrix
composed by all the distinct unavoidable patterns and B is some binary matrix whose columns have weight at least
n − 2.
Notice that, for 1rn, we have that the number of zeroes in A[r] is equal to n − 1, which is odd. This means
that, for 1rn, the matrix B must contain at least a column whose rth entry is equal to zero. Since all B’s columns
have weight at least n− 2, to have that in any row of A‖B there is an even number of zeroes, it results that the number
of columns in B should be at least n/2. Therefore, the number of columns in S is at least n(n − 1)/2 + n/2 = n2/2.
Hence,
m n
2
4
.
Thus, the theorem is proved for n even.
If n ≡ 1mod 4, then we can apply directly Corollary 3.6. So we are left with proving that the last inequality holds.
Consider n ≡ 3mod 4 and let  be a (2, n)-threshold VCS realized by the basis matrices S0 and S1. By Corollary
3.6, the pixel expansion is lower bounded by n(n− 1)/4 = (n2 − n+ 2)/4. We will prove that there does not exist a
VCS with pixel expansion equal to (n2 −n+2)/4. Therefore, m should be at least (n2 −n+2)/4+1 = (n2 −n+6)/4
and the theorem is proved.
Assume by contradiction that  has pixel expansion equal to m = (n2 − n + 2)/4. According to Theorem 3.4, each
of the ( n2 ) columns of weight n− 2 has to appear either in S0 or in S1. Therefore, since ( n2 ) = 2m− 1, one matrix, say
S0, will contain m − 1 = (n2 − n − 2)/4 of such columns; while, S1 will comprise the others m = (n2 − n + 2)/4.
Let U0 the sub-matrix of S0 composed of only m − 1 distinct unavoidable patterns. Now, we prove that there exists
at least an index j, with 1jn, such that w(U0[j ])(n− 3)/2. Assume by contradiction that w(U0[i])(n− 1)/2
for all i with 1 in. Then, we have that the total number of zeroes inU0 is at least n(n−1)/2 which is a contradiction
as, by construction, the total number of zeroes in U0 is 2(m− 1) = (n2 −n− 2)/2. Hence, there exists an index j, with
1jn, such w(U0[j ])(n − 3)/2. Since any row of U0‖S1 (the matrix of all unavoidable patterns) contains n − 1
zeroes, then, for the index j, we have that
w(U0[j ]) n − 32 and w(S
1[j ])n − 1 − n − 3
2
= n + 1
2
.
Since w(S1[j ])−w(U0[j ])2 and the matrix S0 has just one more column besides the columns in U0, there does not
exist a (2, n)-threshold VCS realized by the basis matrices S0 and S1 with pixel expansion equal to (n2 − n + 2)/4.
Hence,
m n
2 − n + 6
4
.
Thus, the theorem holds. 
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4.2. Constructions
In this section, we provide some constructions for (2, n)-threshold VCS. Such constructions are optimal with respect
to the pixel expansion as they meet the bound of Theorem 4.1.
We will consider four cases according to the congruency classes of n modulo four. For each class we will provide the
basis matrices realizing the (2, n)-threshold VCS, but we will prove that such basis matrices are indeed basis matrices
of a (2, n)-threshold VCS only for the case n ≡ 0mod 4. The other cases can be handled in a similar way and the
interested reader can ﬁnd all the proofs in [2].
In order to present constructions for (2, n)-threshold VCSs, we need to set up our notation. If c ∈ {0, 1}n (i.e., c
is a binary vector of length n), then by c(i) we denote the ith entry of c, where 1 in. Moreover, we denote by
ci,j ∈ {0, 1}n the binary column such that w(ci,j ) = n− 2 and c(i) = c(j) = 0. Let I be set such that I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}2.
We denote by M(I) the binary matrix induced by the set of pairs belonging to I, that is M(I) is formed by the columns
ci,j with (i, j) ∈ I . Since, for our construction, the order in which the pairs in I are chosen is immaterial, then the
matrix M(I) is one of the |I |! matrices that can be constructed considering, in any order, the pairs belonging to I.
Finally, with UP(2, n) we denote an n × ( n2 ) binary matrix containing all unavoidable patterns for a (2, n)-threshold
VCS (i.e., UP(2, n) contains all the columns of weight n − 2).
The case n ≡ 0mod 4: To deﬁne the basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS, we will divide the columns of
UP(2, n) in two matrices. The ﬁrst matrix will contain n2/4 distinct unavoidable patterns. The second matrix will
contain all the n(n− 1)/2−n2/4 remaining patters and the duplication of n/2 of them. Deﬁne the sets I1, I2, and I3 as
follows:
I1 = {(i, j) : 1 in/2 and (n + 2)/2jn},
I2 = {(i, j), (i + n/2, j + n/2) : 1 i < jn/2},
I3 = {(i, i + 1) : i = 2p − 1 with 1pn/2}.
We construct the matrices S0 and S1 as depicted in Fig. 3.
We now illustrate the realization of the basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 0mod 4, by considering an
example of the construction depicted in Fig. 3.
Example 4.1. For n = 8, the matrices induced by the sets I1, I2 and I3 are as follows:
M(I1) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0000111111111111
1111000011111111
1111111100001111
1111111111110000
0111011101110111
1011101110111011
1101110111011101
1110111011101110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I2) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
000111111111
011001111111
101010111111
110100111111
111111000111
111111011001
111111101010
111111110100
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I3) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0111
0111
1011
1011
1101
1101
1110
1110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Fig. 3. Basis Matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 0mod 4.
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Therefore, the matrix S0 and S1 generated by the construction depicted in Fig. 3 are:
S0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0000111111111111
1111000011111111
1111111100001111
1111111111110000
0111011101110111
1011101110111011
1101110111011101
1110111011101110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, S1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0001111111110111
0110011111110111
1010101111111011
1101001111111011
1111110001111101
1111110110011101
1111111010101110
1111111101001110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
In this scheme, m = 16 and (m) = 116 .
In the next theorem we prove that the matrices S0 and S1 deﬁned by the scheme in Fig. 3 realize a (2, n)-threshold
VCS for n ≡ 0mod 4. According to Theorem 4.1, the scheme is optimal with respect to the pixel expansion.
Theorem 4.2. The matrices S0 and S1 deﬁned by the scheme in Fig. 3 realize an expansion-optimal (2, n)-threshold
VCS for n ≡ 0mod 4.
Proof. It is immediate to see that both matrices S0 and S1 deﬁned by the scheme in Fig. 3 have n rows. The number of
columns of S0 is equal to |I1| = n2/4; while, the number of columns of S1 is equal to |I2|+ |I3| = n(n−2)/4+n/2 =
n2/4. Hence, S0 and S1 have the same dimensions n and m = |S0| = |S1|.
Toprove thatCondition1ofDeﬁnition2.3 is satisﬁed, notice that I1 and I2 partition the set {(i, j) : 1 in, 1jn,
and i 
= j} and that I3 ⊆ I2. According to the construction in Fig. 3, for any set X = {i, j}, we have that
w(S0X) =
{
n2/4 − 1 if (i, j) ∈ I1,
n2/4 if (i, j) ∈ I2
and
w(S1X) =
⎧⎨
⎩
n2/4 if (i, j) ∈ I1,
n2/4 − 1 if (i, j) ∈ I2\I3,
n2/4 − 2 if (i, j) ∈ I3.
Therefore, Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 2.3 is satisﬁed.
To prove that Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 2.3 holds, we will prove that, for any 1rn, it holds that w(S0[r]) =
w(S1[r]). It is immediate to see that for any 1rn there are n/2 zeroes in S0[r]. Hence, w(S0[r]) = n/2. The
matrix S1 is equal to M(I2)‖M(I3). Hence, w(S1[r]) = w(M(I2)[r]) + w(M(I3)[r]) = (n/2 − 1) + 1 = n/2. Thus,
for 1rn we have that w(S0[r]) = w(S1[r]) and Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 2.3 is satisﬁed.
Finally, notice that since all columns of both S0 and S1 have weight n − 2, then, for any set X of participants
of size at least three, it holds that w(S0X) = w(S1X) = m. Hence, Condition 3 of Deﬁnition 2.3 is satisﬁed, too.
Thus, the matrices S0 and S1 deﬁned by the scheme in Fig. 3 realize a (2, n)-threshold VCS with pixel expan-
sion equal to n2/4. According to Theorem 4.1, such pixel expansion is the smallest achievable and the theorem is
proved. 
The case n ≡ 1mod 4. Notice that, when n ≡ 1mod 4, the matrix UP(2, n) has an even number of columns and
that the number of zeroes in any row of UP(2, n) is also even and it is equal to n − 1. To deﬁne the basis matrices of
a (2, n)-threshold VCS, we will partition the columns of UP(2, n) into two matrices in such a way that such matrices
have the same number of columns and each row has (n − 1)/2 entries equal to zero. Deﬁne the sets I1, I2, I3, and I4
as follows:
I1 = {(i, j) : 1 i < jn},
I2 = {(i, j) : 2 i(n + 1)/2 and (n + 3)/2jn},
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Fig. 4. Basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 1mod 4.
I3 = {(1, j), (1, j + (n − 1)/2) : 2j(n + 3)/4},
I4 = {(i, i + (n − 1)/2) : 2 i(n + 3)/4}.
Notice that the set M(I1) =UP(2, n). We construct the matrices S0 and S1 as depicted in Fig. 4.
We now illustrate the realization of the basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 1mod 4, by considering an
example of the construction depicted in Fig. 4.
Example 4.2. For n = 9, the matrices induced by the sets I2, I3 and I4 are as follows:
M(I2) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1111111111111111
0000111111111111
1111000011111111
1111111100001111
1111111111110000
0111011101110111
1011101110111011
1101110111011101
1110111011101110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I3) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0000
0111
1011
1111
1111
1101
1110
1111
1111
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I4) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
11
01
10
11
11
01
10
11
11
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Therefore, the matrix S0 and S1 generated by the above construction are:
S0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
111111111111110000
000111111111110111
111000111111111011
111111000011111111
111111111100001111
111011011101111101
011111101110111110
101101110111011111
110110111011101111
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, S1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
000011111111111111
111101000111111111
111110011001111111
011111101010111111
101111110100111111
111101111111000111
111110111111011001
110111111111101010
111011111111110100
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
In this scheme, m = 18 and (m) = 118 .
The case n ≡ 2mod 4. The (2, 2)-threshold VCS described by Naor and Shamir [4] satisﬁes Deﬁnition 2.3 and it is
an expansion-optimal VCS. For completeness, we report the basis matrices realizing it:
S0 =
[
10
10
]
, S1 =
[
01
10
]
.
For n ≡ 2mod 4, n > 2, our construction is based on the technique used to realize the (2, n)-threshold VCS for
n ≡ 0mod 4. To deﬁne the basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS, we will divide the columns of UP(2, n) in
two matrices. The ﬁrst matrix will contain n2/4 distinct unavoidable patterns. The second matrix will contain all the
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Fig. 5. Basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 2mod 4, n > 2.
n(n − 1)/2 − n2/4 remaining patterns and the duplication of n/2 of them. For n ≡ 2mod 4 and n > 2, deﬁne the set
I1, I2, I3, I4 and I5 as follows:
I1 = {(i, j) : 1 in/2 and (n + 2)/2jn},
I2 = {(i, j), (i + n/2, j + n/2) : 1 i < jn/2},
I3 = {(i, i + n/2) : 1 in/2},
I4 = {(i, i + n/2 + 1) : 1 in/2 − 1} ∪ {(n/2, n/2 + 1)},
I5 = {(i, i + 1), (i + n/2, i + 1 + n/2) : 1 in/2 − 1} ∪ {(1, n/2), (n/2 + 1, n)}.
Setting I6 = I3, we can construct the matrices S0 and S1 as depicted in Fig. 5.
We now illustrate the realization of the basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 2mod 4 and n > 2, by
considering an example of the construction depicted in Fig. 5.
Example 4.3. For n = 6, the matrices induced by the sets I1, . . . , I6 are as follows:
M(I1) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
000111111
111000111
111111000
011011011
101101101
110110110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I2) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
001111
010111
100111
111001
111010
111100
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I3) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
011
101
110
011
101
110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
M(I4) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
011
101
110
110
011
101
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I5) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
001111
100111
010111
111001
111100
111010
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I6) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
011
101
110
011
101
110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Therefore, the matrix S0 and S1 generated by the above construction are:
S0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
011001111
101100111
110010111
101111001
110111100
011111010
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, S1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
011011011
101101101
110110110
011011110
101101011
110110101
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
In this scheme, m = 9 and (m) = 19 .
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Fig. 6. Basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 3mod 4, n > 3.
The case n ≡ 3mod 4. An expansion-optimal (2, 3)-threshold VCS is described by the following basis matrices.
S0 =
⎡
⎣ 110100
101
⎤
⎦ , S1 =
⎡
⎣ 110001
110
⎤
⎦ . (1)
To deﬁne the basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 3mod 4 and n > 3, we will use the matrices induced
by the following sets:
I1 = {(i, j) : 1 i < jn},
I2 = {(i, j) : 2 i(n + 1)/2 and (n + 3)/2jn},
I3 = {(i, i + (n − 1)/2) : 2 i(n + 1)/4},
I4 = {(1, 2), (1, (n + 3)/2)},
I5 = {(2, (n + 3)/2)},
I6 = {(1, i), (1, i + (n − 1)/2) : 2 i(n + 1)/4}.
We construct the basis matrices S0 and S1 of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 3mod 4 and n > 3 as depicted in
Fig. 6.
We now illustrate the realization of the basis matrices of a (2, n)-threshold VCS for n ≡ 2mod 4 and n > 3, by
considering an example of the construction depicted in Fig. 6.
Example 4.4. Forn = 7, thematrix induced by the set I1 isUP(2, n); while, thematrices induced by the sets I2, . . . , I6
are as follows:
M(I2) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
111111111
000111111
111000111
111111000
011011011
101101101
110110110
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I3) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I4) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
00
01
11
11
10
11
11
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I5) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, M(I6) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
00
01
11
11
10
11
11
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Therefore, the matrix S0 and S1 generated by the above construction are:
S0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
001111111100
010011111101
111100011111
111111100011
101101101110
110110110111
111011011011
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, S1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
100001111111
011110011110
101110101111
110111001111
011111110010
111011110101
111101111001
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
In this scheme, m = 12 and (m) = 112 .
182 C. Blundo et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 369 (2006) 169–182
Comparison: We have seen that, in order to implement a visual cryptography scheme, each pixel of the secret image
is subdivided into m subpixels. Hence, there is a loss of resolution proportional to m. Therefore, schemes with smaller
pixel expansion are better. In [5] the authors described a (2, n)-threshold visual cryptography scheme having pixel
expansion m such that
m =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(n − 1)(n + 3)
4
if n is odd,
n(n + 2)
4
if n is even.
It is immediate to see that the pixel expansion of the schemes presented in this paper is smaller. Hence, our schemes
are better.
Another important measure to measure the goodness of a visual cryptography scheme is the relative difference.
Schemes with higher relative difference are better. Since, the relative difference of our schemes and of the ones
proposed in [5] is equal to 1/m, then our schemes improves on the relative difference, too.
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